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Abstract We present an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol that combines
the OT scheme of Chou and Orlandi [5] together with the supersingular
isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) primitive of De Feo, Jao, and Pluˆt [15].
Our construction is a candidate for post-quantum secure OT and demon-
strates that SIDH naturally supports OT functionality. We consider the
protocol in the simplest configuration of
(
2
1
)
-OT and analyze the protocol
to verify its security.
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1 Introduction
Most, if not all, of cryptography can be based on the notion of Oblivious Transfer
(OT), under the assumption that an efficient such scheme is available. Efficient
OT protocols are known in a quantum-susceptible scenario [5]4, where the un-
derlying security assumption is the hardness of computing discrete logarithms or
factoring integers. Additionally, many papers have introduced OT in the context
of quantum cryptography [2,8,9,23,24,33,38], where the legitimate users mani-
pulate quantum states. The post-quantum OT research has gradually increased
over time. Thus, one of the other examples that could be cited is the work done
by Kazmi [21].
In general, in an OT protocol, the sender wants to transfer one of possibly
many pieces of information to a receiver, giving the receiver the choice of which
information is transferred while remaining oblivious as to what information has
been transferred. For instance, a sender sends two messages, say ma and mb,
and the receiver chooses only one of them (for instance, the receiver chooses
4 Not long ago, there was a supposed attack against scheme from [5]. However, a
technical analysis by Claudio Orlandi seems to have not validated such attack. This
analysis can be found in http://eprint.iacr.org/forum/read.php?18,962.
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ma). At the end of the protocol, the sender does not know which of the mes-
sages was chosen, and also the receiver learns nothing about the other message
(in this case, mb). Most actual OT proposals use a hybrid protocol similar to
hybrid encryption in the public-key cryptography setting, in that a public-key
cryptosystem, in practice, is needed only to bootstrap the initial transmission of
a small piece of data.
This paper is organized as follows. In the section 2 describes our supersin-
gular isogeny oblivious transfer (SIOT) proposal. Moreover, in Section 3 we
discuss some analysis about security aspects from SIOT and finally we conclude
this work in section 4. It should be noted that in appendix A, we introduce
some crucial background used in this paper such as elliptic curve, torsion points,
isogenies, distorsion map, modified Weil pairing and a basic concept of OT. In
appendix B we show some definitions about the process that determines linearly
independent points used by proposed protocol. Furthermore, In appendix C, we
see a simplified form of the OT protocol from [5]. In appendix D, there is the
possibility of applying a symmetric pairing in the security analysis of the SIOT
protocol. Finally, in appendix E we will verify that the proposed protocol is able
to share certain points that allow to execute the OT functionality.
Our contribuition. According to Hazay and Lindell [18], OT is one of
the most important building blocks in cryptography and advantageous for con-
structing secure protocols. In addition, protocols with OT characteristics can
be used in electronic auction environments and contract signing [13]. Thus, we
implemented the OT functionality in the established SIDH protocol from [15],
providing greater privacy between sender and recipient on a communication
channel. Our main aim is to develop a post-quantum OT protocol to achieve
quantum resistance.
2 The
(
2
1
)
- SIOT protocol
In this section, we will see a new scheme called Supersingular Isogeny Oblivious
Transfer (SIOT) protocol. It is fundamentally inspired on schemes from [5] and
[15].
2.1 Notations
We use the cryptographic primitives of the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman
Key Exchange Protocol (SIDH) from [15]. In this way, the following notations
below will be used.
i. p→ A prime such that p = 3 mod 4;
ii. Fp2 → A quadratic extension of Fp, where Fp2 = Fp[i]/〈i2 + 1〉;
iii. E0(Fp2)→ A supersingular elliptic curve over Fp2 ;
iv. Z/`Z→ A field of integers modulo `, where ` is prime and ` - p;
v. PA, QA → Points over the supersingular elliptic curve EA(Fp2);
vi. PB , QB → Points over the supersingular elliptic curve EB(Fp2);
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vii. φA, φB → Isogenies between E0 and EA, E0 and EB , respectively;
viii. φ
′
A, φ
′
B → Isogenies between EB and EBA, EA and EAB , respectively;
ix. GA, HA → Images of PB and QB under Alice’s private isogeny φA;
x. GB , HB → Images of PA and QA under Bob’s private isogeny φB ;
xi. j(EAB)→ j − invariant of supersingular elliptic curve EAB ;
xii. rA, rB → Points from Z/`AZ and Z/`BZ , respectively;
2.2 Protocol
2.2.1 Public parameters
Let E0 be a supersingular curve elliptic defined over Fp2 . For convenience,
assume a prime p of form5 p = `eAA `
eB
B − 1 with `A = 2 and eA > 4 (and
f = 1), or p = 4`eAA `
eB
B − 1, where both `A and `B are odd primes (and f = 4).
Hence, either of these choices yield p = 3 (mod 4), enabling the representation6
Fp2 = Fp[i]/〈i2 + 1〉 and ensuring that the curve E0(Fp2) : y2 = x3 + x is
supersingular, with group order (`eAA `
eB
B f)
2. Furthermore, let PA, QA ∈ E0(Fp2)
be linearly independent points and a basis which generate E0[`
eA
A ]. Similarly, this
statement holds for other PB , QB points which generate E0[`
eB
B ]. In other words,
E0[`
eA
A ] and E0[`
eB
B ] are generated by kernel 〈PA, QA〉 and 〈PB , QB〉, respectively.
Finally, the appendix B presents some definitions used to compute such linearly
dependent points. Before describing the proposed protocol, let’s consider some
premises in the next section.
2.2.2 Premises
As usual let us call “Alice” the sender and “Bob” the receiver, from now on.
1. M be a set of all plaintexts with binary strings of fixed length and (x0, x1)
∈M;
2. C be a set of all ciphertexts with binary strings of fixed length and (c0, c1)
∈ C;
3. Enc(j;x) denote a symmetric encryption scheme taking a shared symmetric
key j (presumably the j-invariant of some shared supersingular elliptic curve)
and a plaintext x;
4. Alice wants to send Bob two messages x0, x1 of her choice. Bob gets to
choose one of them, but does not want Alice to know his choice;
5. Alice and Bob use a secure coin-flipping protocol to agree on a uniformly
random bit string w that is unique for each session (this ensures that neither
Alice not Bob can guess beforehand or control the value of w). This can be
achieved with e.g. Wagner’s bit commitment protocol [35];
6. They also agree on a generic scheme to encode w as a pair of points U , V ∈
EB [`
eA
A ] using the agreed upon deterministic technique.
7
5 Suppose `A and `B are small primes, and f is a cofactor such that p is prime. In
SIDH protocol, the primes allow the curve to have smooth order so that the isogenies
can be computed quickly. See [27] that reports a deep research about the choice of
SIDH-Friendly Primes.
6 For more details about this type of representation, see [19].
7 Since the discrete logarithm problem is easy (even classically) in the relevant elliptic
groups, a sensible method to attain this is to simply hash w to the coefficients of the
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2.2.3 Abstract view of information exchange from
(2
1
)
- SIOT proto-
col
Alice Bob
Input: x0, x1 ∈M Input: b ∈ {0, 1}
Output: None Output: xb
rA ∈ Z/leAA Z rB ∈ Z/leBB Z
φA : E0 → EA φB : E0 → EB
GA ← φA(PB);HA ← φA(QB) GB ← φB(PA);HB ← φB(QA)
ker(φA) = 〈PA + rAQA〉 ker(φB) = 〈PB + rBQB〉
pkA ← (EA, GA, HA) pkA If GA, HA /∈ EA[leBB ],
then abort.
U, V ←$EB [leAA ] then,
GˆB ← (GB − bU)
HˆB ← (HB − bV )
If GˆB , HˆB /∈ EB [leAA ], pˆkB pˆkB ← (EB , GˆB , HˆB)
then abort.
∀i ∈ {0, 1} and U, V ←$EB [leAA ] then,
ker(φ′Ai) = 〈(GˆB + iU) + rA(HˆB + iV )〉
φ′Ai : EB → EBAi
ji ← j(EBAi)
ci ← Enc(ji, xi) (c0, c1) ker(φ′B) = 〈GA + rBHA〉
φ′B : EA → EAB
jb ← j(EAB)
xb ← Enc−1(jb, cb);
Figure 1.
(
2
1
)
- SIOT protocol.
chosen elliptic group basis (rather than resorting to, say, the scheme of Shallue and
van de Woestijne [29]).
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2.2.4 Generation of key pairs
2.2.4.1 Setup - Sender
1. Alice secretly chooses a value rA ∈ Z/`eAA Z;
2. Computes:
(a) φA : E0 → EA;
(b) φA(PB) = GA; φA(QB) = HA;
(c) Ker(φA) = 〈PA + rAQA〉.
3. Alice creates a key pair skA = (φA, rA); pkA = (EA, GA, HA);
4. Alice sends to Bob pkA = (EA, GA, HA). He checks if GA, HA ∈ EA[`eBB ]. If
so, he accepts the received public key. Otherwise, the public key is refused.
Remark 2.2.4.1. Recalling that EA = E0/〈PA + rAQA〉 and |ker(φA)| = |〈PA +
rAQA〉| = `eAA , i.e, degree-`eAA isogeny φA.
Remark 2.2.4.2. Alice computes the projection {φA(PB), φA(QB)} ⊂ EA of the
basis {PB , QB} ⊂ E0[`eBB ] under her secret isogeny φA. Moreover, notice that
`eBB GA = `
eB
B HA = OA ∈ EA.
2.2.4.2 Setup - Receiver
1. Bob secretly chooses a value rB ∈ Z/`eBB Z;
2. Computes:
(a) φB : E0 → EB
(b) φB(PA) = GB ; φB(QA) = HB ;
(c) Ker(φB) = 〈PB + rBQB〉.
3. Computes: GˆB = GB − bU ; HˆB = HB − bV ;
4. Bob creates a public key pˆkA = (EB , GˆB , HˆB) and sends to Sender.
Remark 2.2.4.3. Recalling that EB = E0/〈PB + rBQB〉 and |ker(φB)| = |〈PB +
rBQB〉| = `eBB , i.e, degree-`eBB isogeny φB .
Remark 2.2.4.4. Bob computes his projection {φB(PA), φB(QA)} ⊂ EB of the
basis {PA, QA} ⊂ E0[`eAA ] under his secret isogeny φB . Moreover, notice also
that `eAA GB = `
eA
A HB = OB ∈ EB .
Remark 2.2.4.5. ∀b ∈ {0, 1}, it should be noted that b = 0 then GˆB = GB ;
HˆB = HB and GˆB = (GB − U); HˆB = (HB − V ) if b = 1.
Remark 2.2.4.6. It should be noted that U , V , GB , HB ∈ EB [`eAA ] then, they can
be written as a linear combination, i.e, U = αGB + βHB and V = γGB + δHB
for unique α, β, γ, δ ∈ Z/`eAA Z. In the implementation of the proposed protocol,
a priori, we are not worried about implementing a subprotocol originating from
[29] or [35], as mentioned earlier on section 2.2.2. In other words, we have
implemented a simpler deterministic technique for getting α, β, δ and γ values.
Remark 2.2.4.7. Alice and Bob encode the shared bit string w as a pair of points
U , V ∈ EB [`eAA ] using the agreed upon deterministic technique. This ensures that
the pair of points (GB + U,HB + V ) and (GB − U,HB − V ) are generated by
EB [`
eA
A ]. If they do not, restarts the whole protocol by choosing a different string
w.
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2.2.5 Generation of secret keys ji = EBAi such that i ∈ {0, 1}
2.2.5.1 Setup - Sender
1. Upon reception of (EB , GˆB , HˆB), Alice checks if GˆB , HˆB ∈ EB [`eAA ]. If so,
she accepts the received public key. Otherwise, the public key is refused;
2. Alice computes:
(a) ∀i ∈ {0, 1} φ′Ai : EB → EBAi , Ker(φ′Ai) = 〈(GˆB + iU) + rA(HˆB + iV )〉;
(b) ji ← j−invariant(EBAi). (1)
2.2.5.2 Setup - Receiver
1. Bob computes:
(a) φ′B : EB → EAB ,Ker(φ′B)〈GA + rBHA〉;
(b) jb ← j−invariant(EAB) such that b ∈ {0, 1}. (2)
2.2.6 Encryption and Decryption
1. Alice encrypts ci ← Enc(ji, xi) such that i ∈ {0, 1} and sends to Bob c =
(c0, c1);
2. Bob decrypts and gets xb = Enc
−1(jb, cb) such that b ∈ {0, 1}.
Remark 2.2.6.1. From equations (1) and (2) above, it is verified that a key
j(EBAi) = j(EAB), if b = i and if b 6= i then j(EBAi) 6= j(EAB) such that
b, i ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, at the end of the protocol if both parts are honest then we
have that jb = ji. Therefore, we can conclude that if the Bob chooses a unique
b, then it will share a unique secret key with Alice.
3 Analysis of the SIOT protocol
3.1 Supersingular Isogeny Problems
In this section, we will see some cases of computational problems from super-
singular elliptic curves that were adapted by [15]. Such problems reinforce the
security of the proposed protocol. Therefore, let a supersingular curve E0 over
Fp2 together with independent bases {PA, QA} and {PB , QB} of E0[`eAA ] and
E0[`
eB
B ], respectively. Furthermore, recall p be a prime of the form defined on
section 2.2.1.
Problem 1 (Decisional Supersingular Isogeny (DSSI) problem). Let EB(Fp2) be
another supersingular curve. Decide whether EB is `
eB
B -isogenous to E0. In this
case, we could suppose that even if we knew that E0 and EB had the same
cardinality by Tate’s theorem [32], this would not be enough to decide correctly
if there is an isogeny of degree `eBB between them.
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Problem 2 (Computational Supersingular Isogeny (CSSI) problem). Let φA :
E0 → EA be an isogeny whose kernel is 〈PA + [rA]QA〉 for some rA ∈ Z/`eAA Z.
Given EA and the values φA(PB), φA(QB) then, find a generator RA of 〈PA +
[rA]QA〉. In this case, we could suppose that given only a public key (EA, φA(PB),
φA(QB)) then, we won’t be to able to determine any value from kernel because
we don’t know the corresponding private key (φA, rA).
Problem 3 (Supersingular Computational Diffie-Helmann (SSCDH) problem).
Let φA : E0 → EA be an isogeny whose kernel is 〈PA + [rA]QA〉 for some
rA ∈ Z/`eAA Z and let φB : E0 → EB be an isogeny whose kernel is 〈PB+[rB ]QB〉
for some rB ∈ Z/`eBB Z. Given EA, EB and the values GA, HA,GB , HB then, find
the j − invariant of E0/〈PA + [rA]QA, PB + [rB ]QB〉. In this case, we could as-
sume that given only the two public keys (EA, GA, HA) and (EB , GB , HB) and
not knowing any of their respective private keys (φA, rA) and (φB , rB) then, it
will be impracticable to compute the value of a j − invariant.
In the next sections, we will present some notations and definitions for se-
curity analysis of proposed protocol. After that, we will check some minimal
requirements that are important to make such protocol secure.
3.2 Notations
In our analysis of the proposed protocol, the following notations below will be
used.
i. Application of Ve´lu’s formula8 → V e´lu′s formula{〈GA+rBHA〉, EA}, where
parameters EA, GA, HA and rB are denoted in section 2.1;
ii. The view of Alice in an execution, for a two-party protocol with parties Sender
(Alice) and Receiver (Bob)→ {V IEWAlice(Alice(1n, τ), Bob(1n, b))}, where
Alice has input τ , Bob has input b, and the security parameter is 1n;
Remark 3.2.0.1. Similarly, we denote the view of Bob by {V IEWBob(Alice(1n, τ),
Bob(1n, b))}.
iii. Both Alice and Bob dishonest → Alice∗, Bob∗, respectively.
3.3 Preliminaries
Definition 3.3.0.1. A function (·) is negligible in n, or just negligible, if for
every positive polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large ns it holds that (·) <
1/p(·).
Remark 3.3.0.1. For example, the functions 2−
√
n and n− log2 n are negligible as
function in n. For more details, see [17].
8 See proposition A.1.5.2
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Definition 3.3.0.2. A probability ensemble X = {X (n, a)} is an infinite se-
quence of random variables indexed by n ∈ N and a ∈ {0, 1}∗. The value n will
represent the security parameter and a will represent the parties’ inputs.
Definition 3.3.0.3. Two distribution ensembles X = {X (n, a)} and Y = {Y(n, a)}
are said to be computationally indistinguishable, denoted by X c≡ Y, if for every
non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible function (·)
such that for every n ∈ N and a ∈ {0, 1}∗,
|Pr[D(X (n, a)) = 1]− Pr[D(Y(n, a)) = 1]| 6 (n)
Remark 3.3.0.2. All parties are assumed to run in time that is polynomial in
the security parameter which value 1n is written.
3.4 Some analysis requirements
A priori, secure protocols should resist any adversarial attack. Even, Goldreich
and Lempel [13] developed a form
(
2
1
)
- OT to build protocols for secure multi-
party computation. Thus, in order to formally prove that a protocol is secure, say
an OT protocol, Hazay and Lindell [18] mentions some required properties such
as privacy, correctness, independence of inputs, guaranteed output delivery and
fairness. Evidently, such list does not constitute a rigorous definition of security,
but rather a set of requirements that should hold for any secure protocol. More-
over, they also state that the two most important requirements in any secure
computing protocol are privacy and correctness. Thus, we will see below these
requirements for the security analysis of the protocol proposed in this work.
3.4.1 Correctness
Each party should have a guarantee that the output he or she receives from
the protocol is correct . We assume that both parties, say Alice and Bob, should
be honests, then it will be possible to compute a shared secret in the end of pro-
tocol. In other words, only one of two messages (x0 or x1) should be decrypted,
say, xb ← Enc−1(jb, cb) without loss of generality. Therefore, it should be true
that j(EBAi) = j(EAB), i.e, a j − invariant computed by Alice will be exactly
the same as that computed by Bob. In figure 2, the pseudocode shows that this
holds, since if the value b, secretly chosen by Bob, is equal to the value i from
Alice then, there will be a secret value shared between Alice and Bob. Otherwise,
there will be no shared secret.
3.4.2 Privacy
Informally speaking, each party should only learn its intended output from
the protocol and nothing else. In the protocol, the choices of Bob shouldn’t be
known to Alice. At the end of the protocol, Bob can’t get any knowledge about
the message that he did not decrypt. Formally, we shall see below a suitable
and analogous definition from Hazay and Lindell [18] applied to the proposed
protocol.
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for b, i ∈ {0, 1} do
if b = i then
j(EBAi) = j(EB/〈GB + rAHB〉) = j(EAB) = j(EA/〈GA + rBHA〉);
return “Shared secret”
elseif b 6= i then
j(EBAi) = j(EB/〈(GB − bU + iU) + rA(HB − bV + iV )〉) 6= j(EAB) =
j(EA/〈GA + rBHA〉);
return “No shared secret”
endfor
Figure 2. Pseudocode of information exchange between two parties of the SIOT pro-
tocol.
Definition 3.4.2.1. A two-message two-party probabilistic polynomial - time
protocol (Alice, Bob) is said to be a private oblivious transfer if the following
holds:
i. Non-triviality: If Alice and Bob follow the protocol then after an execution
in which Alice has for input any x0, x1 ∈ M9 and Bob has input bit b ∈
{0, 1}, the output of Bob is xb. In other words, Bob receives pkA and the pair
(c0, c1) from Alice. Recalling that pkA ← (EA, GA, HA) and cb ← Enc(jb, xb)
are well defined. Thus, non-triviality follows from the fact that
V e´lu′s formula{〈GA + rBHA〉, EA} ⇒ EAB ∴
j(EAB) ⇒ jAB.
Therefore, xb ← Enc−1(jAB , cb) such that jAB = jb and b is an unique value
secretly chosen by Bob.
Remark 3.4.2.1. Upon receiving pkA, say Alice’s public key, Bob will not be
able to compute her private key, say (φA, rA). If that could be possible, there
would be a violation of the CSSI problem (problem 2).
ii. Privacy in the case of a dishonest Alice: Note that this requirement
is that Alice’s view when Bob has input 0 is indistinguishable from its view
when Bob has input 1. In other words, the view of a supposed adversarial,
say Alice, consists merely of public key pˆkB. Hence, recalling figure 1, we
can see that:
Lemma 1. Alice on input pˆkB cannot guess b with probability greater than
1/2 + (n), for some negligible function (n) and ∀ n ∈ N
9 Recall M be the set of all plaintexts with binary strings of fixed length.
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Proof. We can assume that on receiving pˆkB and not knowing the value
of Bob’s bit b, Alice cannot distinguish the pairs of tuples {(EB , GB , HB)}
and {(EB , (GB − U), (HB − V )}, i.e, for some GˆB , HˆB ∈ EB [`eAA ] such
that Pr[(EB , GB , HB) = (EB , GˆB , HˆB)] = Pr[(EB , GB − U,HB − V ) =
(EB , GˆB , HˆB))] which is independent of b . Thus, this case is similar to
the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Hence, analogously con-
sidering such assumption, we have that:
{(EB , GB , HB)} c≡ {EB , G˚B , H˚B}10
Now, assume by contradiction that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time distinguisher11 D and a non-negligible function  such that for every
n
|Pr[D(EB , GB , HB) = 1]− Pr[D(EB , G˚B , H˚B) = 1]| > (n)
where GB , HB ∈ EB [`eAA ]. Then, by subtracting and adding
Pr[D(EB , G˜B , H˜B) = 1]12
We have
|Pr[D(EB , GB , HB) = 1]− Pr[D((EB , G˚B , H˚B) = 1]| 6
|Pr[D(EB , GB , HB) = 1]− Pr[D(EB , G˜B , H˜B) =
1]|+ |Pr[D(EB , G˜B , H˜B) = 1]− Pr[D(EB , G˚B , H˚B) = 1]|
Thus, by the contradicting assumption,
|Pr[D(EB , GB , HB) = 1]− Pr[D(EB , G˜B , H˜B) = 1]| > (n)
2
(3.1)
or
|Pr[D(EB , G˜B , H˜B) = 1]− Pr[D(EB , G˚B , H˚B) = 1]| > (n)
2
(3.2)
Let that (4.1) holds. Thus, we can construct a distinguisher D˜ for the DDH
assumption that works as follow. Upon input pˆkB = {(EB , G˚B , H˚B)}, the
10 Let G˚B = (GB − U) and H˚B = (HB − V ), where U, V ∈ EB [`eAA ].
11 Informally, a distinguisher is an algorithm that describes an adversary’s advantage.
In addition, [28] explains that a distinguisher is just an algorithm, possibly a prob-
abilistic one, equipped with way to interact with its environment.
12 Let G˜B = (G˚B −R) and H˜B = (H˚B − S), where R,S ∈ EB [`eAA ].
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distinguisher D˜ randomly chooses the pair of points R,S ∈ EB [`eAA ]. Then,
pˆk′B = {(EB , G˜B , H˜B)}. On the other hand, if pˆkB = {(EB , GB , HB)} then
pˆk′B = {EB , (GB − R), (HB − S)}. Note that the pairs of points U and V
are not used in the last tuple pˆk′B. However, these points as points R and S
from to the same elliptic group EB [`
eA
A ] and could also be randomly chosen
by D˜, say U and V . Thus, we have that pˆk′B = {(EB , GB , HB)} and
|Pr[D˜(EB , GB , HB) = 1]− Pr[D˜(EB , G˚B , H˚B) = 1]| =
|Pr[D(EB , GB , HB) = 1]− Pr[D(EB , G˜B , H˜B) = 1]| > (n)
2
in contradiction to the DDH assumption. An analogous analysis follows in
the case where (4.2) holds. The proof of Bob’s privacy is concluded by noting
that {(EB , GB , HB)}, {(EB , G˚B , H˚B)}, regardless of the value of b, are in-
distinguishable in Alice’s view. In other words, let τ ∈ {0, 1}∗ be an auxiliary
input. Thus,
{V IEWAlice∗(Alice∗(1n, τ), Bob(1n, 0))} c≡ {V IEWAlice∗(Alice∗(1n, τ),
Bob(1n, 1))}
Therefore, the privacy of Bob follows from analogous DDH assumption over
the elliptic group EB [`
eA
A ]. uunionsq
iii. Privacy in the case of a dishonest Bob: Let pˆkB ← (EB , GˆB , HˆB)
denotes Bob’s public key sent to Alice. Recall that GˆB ← GB, HˆB ← HB,
if b = 0 and GˆB ← (GB − U), HˆB ← (HB − V ), if b = 1. Moreover, the
Alice’s public key, say pkA := (EA, GA, HA), sent to Bob and an unique
j − invariant jb = j(V e´lu′s formula{〈GA + rBHA〉, EA}) computed by him
upon receiving pkA are well defined. After that, ∀ i ∈ {0, 1}, Alice will com-
pute ji = j(V e´lu
′s formula{〈(GˆB + iU) + rA(HˆB + iV )〉, EB}), i.e, j0 and
j1. In addition, recalling the correctness requirement from subsection 3.4.1,
Alice will share an unique secret key with Bob. Therefore, the Alice’s privacy
is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Bob can’t compute two j − invariants j0 and j1 (j0 6= j1)
whether SSCDH problem is hard.
Proof. If Bob could compute j0 and j1 then it would be a violation of the
SSCDH problem (problem 3). In other words, Bob will be able to compute
just an unique j − invariant, depending on the chosen value of b. uunionsq
Complementing the lemma proof above, let b ∈ {0, 1} be an auxiliary input
and every triple of inputs x0, x1, x ∈ M13. Thus, another way to view the
Alice’s privacy is that Bob’s first message, denoted by Bob* (1n, b), deter-
mines whether it should receive x0 or x1. For example, if it determines that
13 Recall M be the set of all plaintexts with binary strings of fixed length.
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it should receive x0, then its view when Alice’s input is (x0, x1) is indistin-
guishable from its view when Alice’s input is (x0, x). Evidently, this implies
that Bob cannot learn anything about x1 when it receives x0 and vice versa.
Hence,
{V IEWBob∗(Alice(1n, (x0, x1));Bob∗(1n, b))}n∈N c≡ {V IEWBob∗(Alice(1n,
(x0, x));Bob
∗(1n, b))}n∈N
or
{V IEWBob∗(Alice(1n, (x0, x1));Bob∗(1n, b))}n∈N c≡ {V IEWBob∗(Alice(1n,
(x, x1));Bob
∗(1n, b))}n∈N uunionsq
After analyzing all the requirements from definition 3.4.2.1 on the SIOT
protocol and recalling p be a prime of the form defined on section 2.2.1, we can
formulate the following theorem,
Theorem 3.4.1. Assume that an analogous decisional Diffe-Hellman (DDH)
assumption and a Supersingular Computational Diffe-Hellman (SSCDH) pro-
blem are hard in an elliptic group E(Fp2). Then, SIOT protocol is a private
oblivious transfer as in definition 3.4.2.1.
3.5 Further distinguisher and other analyzes
So far, we have demonstrated that SIOT protocol guarantees privacy between
sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob). In addition, it should be recalled that the
proposed protocol is based on the arithmetic of supersingular elliptic curves
from [15], i.e, the structure of The SIOT protocol inherits the security features
from SIDH protocol. However, we still consider it necessary to analyze the secu-
rity of SIOT protocol. Thus, considering the case of a dishonest Alice, she will
use a pairing-based distinguisher for trying to find out the secret value b from
honest Bob. In the second situation, the roles will be inverted, i.e, Alice will be
considered an honest sender and Bob a dishonest receiver. In the latter case,
an analysis is performed in such a way that some algebraic conditions must be
obeyed so that Bob is not able to decipher both Alice’s messages.
3.5.1 Preventing a pairing-based distinguisher from a possible Alice’s
dishonesty
Considering the situation where Alice (the dishonest sender) receiving the
information (EB , GˆB , HˆB) from Bob, a priori, does not know whether to receive
(EB , GB , HB) or (EB , GB − U,HB − V ). Alice might consider using the Weil
pairing to distinguish between these two values.
In what follows, all pairings have order `eAA . After all, the correct points GB =
φB(PA) and HB = φB(QA) are known to satisfy e(GB , HB) = e(PA, QA)
`
eA
A : if
this relation does not hold for both of (GˆB , HˆB) or (GˆB +U, HˆB + V ), it would
reveal which key Bob chose. More generally, because Alice can add any multiple
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of (U, V ) to (GˆB , HˆB) and look for such a mismatch, one must have e(GˆB +
λU, HˆB + λV ) = e(GB , HB) = e(PA, QA)
`
eA
A for any λ ∈ Z/`eAA Z. Recalling14
that U = αGB + βHB , V = γGB + δHB , this condition means that:
e(GB + λU,HB + λV ) = e(GB + λαGB + λβHB , HB + λγGB + λδHB)
= e((1 + λα)GB + λβHB , λγGB + (1 + λδ)HB)
= e((1 + λα)GB , λγGB)
· e((1 + λα)GB , (1 + λδ)HB)
· e(λβHB , λγGB)
· e(λβHB , (1 + λδ)HB)
= 1
· e(GB , HB)(1+λα)(1+λδ)
· e(HB , GB)λβλγ
· 1
= e(GB , HB)
(1+λα)(1+λδ)−λ2βγ
= e(GB , HB),
hence it is necessary that (1+λα)(1+λδ)−λ2βγ = 1 (mod `eAA ), or equivalently
λ(α + δ) + λ2(αδ − βγ) = 0 (mod `eAA ). This must hold for any choice of λ,
in particular those that are invertible mod `eAA , and hence it must hold that
λ(αδ − βγ) = −(α + δ) (mod `eAA ). Once more, this can only hold for any λ
if αδ − βγ = 0 (mod `eAA ) and α + δ = 0 (mod `eAA ), or equivalently, δ = −α
(mod `eAA ) and α
2 + βγ = 0 (mod `eAA ). Therefore, in principle, such conditions
should be obeyed to avoid Alice finds out Bob’s choice. uunionsq
3.5.2 Possible decryptions from a possible Bob’s dishonesty
Recalling U, V ∈ EB [`eAA ] be linearly independent points, and write U =
αGB +βHB , V = γGB + δHB . Suppose Alice receives an information (EB , GˆB ,
HˆB) from Bob. Then, Alice will compute actually the degree-`
eA
A isogeny φ
′
A0
:
EB → EBA0 whose kernel is ker(φ′A0) = 〈GB + rAHB〉 and φ′A1 : EB → EAB1
whose kernel is ker(φA1) = 〈(GB +U)+ rA(HB +V )〉. It should be noted15 that
if ker(φ′A0) j ker(φA1) then, EBA0 is isomorphic to EBA1 i.e., EBA0 ∼= EBA1 .
Moreover, if φA1 is separable then there is a unique isogeny φˆA : EBA0 → EBA1 .
Now (GB +U) + rA(HB +V ) = (GB +αGB +βHB) + rA(HB + γGB + δHB) =
(1 +α+ γrA)GB + (rA + β+ δrA)HB . Hence, by inspection, this point can only
be in 〈GB + rAHB〉 with the following conditions:
1. (1 + α+ γrA) is invertible mod `
eA
A (i.e. if `A - 1 + α+ γrA);
14 Appendix A.1.1
15 See theorem 9.6.18 from [16] and proposition 12.12 from [36].
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2. (rA + β + δrA)/(1 + α + γrA) = rA (mod `
eA
A ), which means γr
2
A + (α +
δ)rA−β = 0 (mod `eAA ) and hence γr2A+(α−δ)rA−β = 0 (mod `A). Thus,
a simple constraint on the coefficients ensures that the last equation has no
solution then, just force `A | γ and `A | (α− δ), but `A - β.
Therefore, it is important that this equation has no solution because, oth-
erwise, if Alice and Bob cannot control the coefficients α, β, γ, δ apart from
ensuring conditions as above, Bob could be able to decrypt both messages from
Alice. uunionsq
3.5.3 Summing up the conditions
In this section we will consider the three conditions on α, β, γ, and δ based
on the equations obtained in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 to ensure SIOT protocol
security in a scenario where Alice and Bob are dishonest parties. Thus, conditions
on α, β, γ, and δ are obtained that guarantee that Alice will not be able to get
the secret choice of Bob’s bit b and he will not be able to decipher both pairs
c0 and c1 sent by Alice. Combining these relations yields γ = −α2/β (mod `eAA )
since β is certainly invertible mod `eAA . In particular, this means V = −(α/β)U .
uunionsq
Additionally, in the appendix D we will see the application of a symmetric
pairing to analyze other possible conditions relative to the coefficients of the
points U and V . Moreover, the appendix E shows the process of sharing of these
last points.
4 Conclusion
We introduce a hybrid protocol called SIOT using a post-quantum protocol called
SIDH, whose security is based on the difficulty of an adversary to compute iso-
genies between supersingular elliptic curves, and an OT protocol whose security
feature is based on the privacy between a sender and receiver on a communication
channel. For the security analysis of the proposed protocol, an evaluation of the
correctness and privacy properties based on the DDH problem was performed,
considering a supposed scenario with a dishonest sender and an honest receiver
and vice versa. Thus, this analysis verified the guarantee of privacy between
the parties involved in the communication channel. In addition, considering the
same scenario mentioned above, an algebraic analysis was performed using Weil
pairing. This analysis formulated some necessary conditions for choosing the val-
ues of the coefficients α, β, δ and γ such that both sender and receiver cannot
violate the security of the proposed protocol. It should be noted that the SIOT
protocol inherits the conjectures of the isogenies computational problems from
SIDH protocol. Finally, it was also considered the possibility of applying sym-
metric pairing in the security analysis of SIOT protocol taking into account also
conditions in choosing the values of the coefficients mentioned above.
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A The Basic Theory
Throughout this appendix, unless otherwise noted, we are going to use the fol-
lowing notation:
– Fp → A finite Field, where p = 3 be a prime;
– F¯p → A fixed algebraic closure of Fp;
– Fpk → An extension of order k of finite field Fp;
– E, E˜ → Two fixed elliptic curves over Fp;
– E(Fp), E(F¯p) → The set of pairs (x, y) satisfying the Weierstrass equation
of E where x and y are taken in Fp or F¯p, respectively;
– #E → Cardinality of the E group, i.e, the number of elements in an elliptic
group ;
– φ or ψ → An algebraic map between E and E˜ and ;
– OE → A point at infinity on a curve E.
A.1 Elliptic Curves
Let p = 3 be a prime. An elliptic curve E over Fp, i.e, E(Fp), is an equation of the
form E(Fp) : y2 = x3 +Ax+B with A,B ∈ Fp satisfying 4 = 4A3 + 27B2 6= 0.
Equations of this type are called Weierstrass equations. The set of points on
E with coordinates in Fp is the set E(Fp) = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ Fp satisfy y2 =
x3+Ax+B}∪{O}16. The points of an elliptic curve E has addition properties17
and hence, form an Abelian Group. The quantity 4 is called discriminant and
there is a quantity j called j − invariant of a Weierstrass equations defined by
j = −1728(4A)3/4.
There are other types of elliptic curves such as Montgomery Form (By2 =
x3 + Ax2 + x) and Edwards Form (x¯2 + y¯2 = 1 + dx¯2y¯2). These special forms
are well suited for certain computations and many authors have used them
to improve the efficiency of diverse cryptographic applications18. Despite the
recognized importance of these special curves, this work is focused on Weier-
strass equation for the introduction of the concept of SIOT protocol. Lastly, for
more details about all types of elliptic curves applied in cryptograph, see [16].
16 The point O is a special point located “at infinity”. It acts like zero for elliptic curve
addition on finite field prime.
17 See theorem 6.5 from [19].
18 See, for instance, [4,7,10,15,22,37]
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A.1.1 Points of finite order
The concept of points of finite order is important for a later and better un-
derstanding about the concept of kernels in the isogeny of elliptic curves. Thus,
according to [19] let ` ≥ 1 be an integer and E be an elliptic curve over Fp. A
point P ∈ E(Fp) satisfying the identity19 `P = O is called a point of order `
or `-torsion point in the group E(Fp). The set of `-torsion points is denoted by
E[`] = {P ∈ E : [`]P = O} and E[`] is a subgroup of E(Fp). For ` such that p - `
then E[`] ∼= Z/`Z×Z/`Z. If ` is prime then, E[`] can be view as a 2-dimensional
vector space over the field Z/`Z,i.e., given points P,Q,R ∈ E[`] then, we can
write a linear combination P = αQ+ βR for unique α, β ∈ Z/`Z.
A.1.2 Supersingular elliptic curve
As our proposed protocol is based on [15], now we are going to see some
concepts to supersingular elliptic curves. According to [36] an elliptic curve E(Fp)
is called supersingular if E[p] = O. In other words, there are no points of order p,
even with coordinates in an algebraically closed field. Thus, let p > 3 be prime
then, the elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + x over Fp is supersingular if and only
if p = 3 mod 4. Moreover, the theorem 9.11.2 from [16] lists other properties
that satisfy a supersingular elliptic curve over Fp. On the other hand, if a given
elliptic curve does not satisfy any of the conditions in this theorem then this
elliptic curve is called ordinary.
Supersingular curves can be defined over Fp or Fp2 . The field with p2 elements
resembles Fp2 = {a+ bi : a, b ∈ Fp}, where i satisfies i2 = −1. For more details,
see [19,30].
A.1.3 The Weil pairing
The Weil pairing has notorious applications to cryptography, for instance
[3,20,25]. Now we recall some concepts and properties of this type of pairing
that will be important to understand later its use in the security analysis of the
protocol proposed in this work.
Definition A.1. The Weil pairing e` takes as input a pair of points P,Q ∈
E[`] and gives as output an `th root of unity e`(P,Q). In addition, e` has the
followings properties:
i. The values of the Weil pairing satisfy e`(P,Q)
` = 1 for all P,Q ∈ E[`];
ii. The Weil pairing is bilinear then e`(P,QA + QB) = e`(P,QA)e`(P,QB) for
all P,QA, QB ∈ E[`] and e`(PA + PB , Q) = e`(PA, Q)e`(PB , Q) for all
PA, PB , Q ∈ E[`];
iii. The Weil pairing is alternating, which means that e`(P, P ) = 1 for all P ∈
E[`]. This implies that e`(P,Q) = e`(Q,P )
−1 for all P,Q ∈ E[`]. In addition,
if e`(P,Q) = e`(Q,P ) then, the pairing is symmetric;
iv. The Weil pairing is nondegenerate, which means that if e`(P,Q) = 1 for all
Q ∈ E[`], then P = O.
19 `P means P + P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
` times
.
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A.1.4 Distortion map and modified Weil pairing
Definition A.1. Let E be an elliptic curve, ` = 3 be a prime, P ∈ E[`] be
a point of order ` and ψ : E → E be a map from E to itself. Thus, ψ is an
`− distortion map for P if it has the following properties:
i. ψ(nP ) = nψ(P ) ∀ n = 1;
ii. e`(P,ψ(P ))
r = 1 if and only if `|r (i.e, r is a multiple of `.).
Proposition A.1.4.1. Let E be the elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + x over Fp2 and
suppose that Fp2 has an element α ∈ Fp2 satisfying α2 = −1. Define a map ψ
by ψ(x, y) = (−x, αy) and ψ(O) = O.
i. Let P ∈ E(Fp2). Then ψ(P ) ∈ E(Fp2), so ψ is a map from E(Fp2) to itself;
ii. The map ψ respects the addition law on E , i.e, ψ(P1 +P2) = ψ(P1) +ψ(P2)
∀ P1, P2 ∈ E(Fp2).
Proof. See [19] and Section 13.1.6 from [6]. uunionsq
Definition A.2. Let ` = 3 be a prime, Q and Q′ be multiples of P ∈ E[`]. Thus,
the modified Weil pairing eˆ` on E[`] is defined by eˆ`(Q,Q
′) = e`(Q,ψ(Q′)).
Proposition A.1.4.2. Let E be an elliptic curve, let P ∈ E[`], let ψ be an `-
distortion map for P , and let eˆ` be the modified Weil pairing relative to ψ. Let Q
and Q
′
be multiples of P . Then, eˆ`(Q,Q
′) = 1 if and only if Q = O or Q′ = O.
Proof. See [19]. uunionsq
A.1.5 Isogenies
In short, isogeny-based cryptography utilizes unique algebraic maps between
elliptic curves that satisfy group homomorphism. This original idea introduced
by [1]20 detailed a Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem based on the hardness of com-
puting isogenies between ordinary elliptic curves. Nevertheless, [11] developed
a quantum algorithm that could compute isogenies between ordinary curves in
subexponential time. This algorithm uses the fact that the structure of the ellip-
tical group is commutative. Thus, [15] adapted the isogeny-based key exchange
protocol to be based on the difficulty of computing isogenies between supersin-
gular elliptic curves, which does not have commutative endomorphism ring.
Definition A.1. Let E1 and E2 be elliptic curves over Fp. An isogeny over
Fp is a morphism φ : E1 → E2 over Fp such that φ(OE1) = OE2 is a group
homomorphism. The zero isogeny is the constant map φ : E1 → E2 given by
φ(P ) = OE2 for all P ∈ E(F¯p). If there is an isogeny between two elliptic curves
E1 and E2 then:
i. E1 and E2 are isogenous;
20 See [31] to better understand the history of isogeny-based cryptographic.
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ii. #E1(Fp) = #E2(Fp) [32];
iii. E1 and E2 have the same − invariant if and only if E1 w E2 over F¯p (i.e.
exists an isomorfism from E1 to E2)
21.
Definition A.2. Let E1 and E2 be elliptic curves over Fp and φ : E1 → E2 over
Fp. The degree of a non-zero isogeny is the degree of the morphism. The degree
of the zero isogeny is 0. If there is an isogeny of degree ` between elliptic curves
E1 and E2 then they are `-isogenous.
Definition A.3. Let E1 and E2 be elliptic curves over Fp and φ : E1 → E2 an
isogeny. Then the kernel of an isogeny is ker(φ) = {P ∈ E1(F¯p) : φ(P ) = OE2}.
Definition A.4. A non-zero isogeny separable φ : E1 → E2 over Fp of ` - degree
has #ker(φ) = `, i.e, the number of kernel elements equals to `. [16].
Definition A.5. Let φ : E1 → E2 and φˆ : E2 → E3 be two isogenies with `-
degree and ˆ`-degree, respectively. Then, their composition is an isogeny φˆ(φ) : E1 →
E3 with (` · ˆ`)-degree.
Proposition A.1.5.1. Let E1 be an elliptic curve over Fp and G a finite sub-
group of E1(F¯p) that is defined over Fp. Then, there is an unique elliptic curve
EG and a separable isogeny φ : E1 → EG = E1/G such that Ker(φ) = G.
Proof. See Theorem 25.1.6 and Corollary 25.1.7 from [16]. uunionsq
The Ve´lu’s formula [34] can be used for computing a separable isogeny from
an elliptic curve E1 with given kernel G. Velu´ showed how to explicitly find
the rational function form of a normalized φ : E1 → EG. The Ve´lu’s formula is
presented in next proposition.
Proposition A.1.5.2. Let E(Fp) : y2 = x3 + ax+ b be an elliptic curve defined
over Fp, and let G ⊂ E(F¯p) be a finite subgroup. The separate isogeny φ : E1 →
EG, of kernel G, can be written as
φ(P ) =
(
x(P ) +
∑
Q∈G/{O}
x(P +Q)− x(Q), y(P ) + ∑
Q∈G/{O}
y(P +Q)− y(Q)
)
and the curve EG has equation y2 = x3 + a
′
x+ b
′
, where
a
′
= a− 5
∑
Q∈G/{O}
(3x(Q)2 + a),
b
′
= b− 7
∑
Q∈G/{O}
(5x(Q)3 + 3ax(Q) + b)
Proof. See [14]. uunionsq
21 Theorem 9.3.6 from [16].
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Supersingular curves have the property that for every prime ` 6= p, there
exist ` + 1 isogenies of degree ` originating from a given supersingular curve
and a common field that includes all isogenous curves in Fp2 [27]. However, it
is believed to be hard to determine the isogeny degree. Thus, the security of
the cryptosystem from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies is based on this as-
sumption. From now on, in this work, we will consider all the elliptic curves as
supersingular over Fp2 .
A.2 Oblivious Transfer protocol
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a protocol in which a sender transfers one of many
pieces of information to a receiver, but remains oblivious as to what piece has
been transferred. The original notion of OT was first proposed by Rabin in 1981
[26] in which a sender sends an encrypted message to a receiver and this one could
decrypt such message with probability 1/2. After this, [13] presented a general
form of OT, named 1-out-of-2 OT,
(
2
1
)
- OT for short, i.e, where a sender sends
two encrypted messages to a receiver being able to decrypt only one of them.
Moreover, many authors have generalized this to
(
n
1
)
- OT where the receiver
chooses one message out of n and
(
k
n
)
-OT in which the receiver chooses a subset
of size k from among n messages. In this work, we will be focused only on
(
2
1
)
- OT. Therefore, for a merely conceptual and basic view, the OT protocol [5]
is presented on appendix C. As can be seen, a sender has two input messages22
M0, M1 ∈ M and a receiver has a choice bit b. At the end of the protocol the
receiver is supposed to learn the message Mb and nothing else, while the sender
is supposed to learn nothing, after he sends the messages M0 and M1. The fig 3
describes the pseudocode of the exchange of information23 between two parts of
the OT protocol proposed in [5].
B Linearly independent points and
(
2
1
)
- SIOT protocol
implementation
In this appendix B, we present definitions for the understanding of the process
that determines the choice of linearly independent points PA, QA, PB and QB in
the proposed protocol.
Definition B.1 (Frobenius). Let E(Fq) be an ellipic curve, and let E(Fqk)
be its Fqk -rational extension. The Frobenius map is the function Φ : E(Fqk) →
E(Fqk) defined by Φ(x, y) = (xq, yq) for any (x, y) ∈ E(Fqk). Φi denotes its
i-th self-composition, i.e. for any P ∈ E(Fqk), Φi(P ) := P for i = 0, and
Φi(P ) = Φ(Φi−1(P )) for i > 0.
22 Let M be the set of all plaintexts with binary strings of fixed length.
23 This exchange of information involves the sharing of one K key between the parts.
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for b, i ∈ {0, 1} do
if b = i then
kb = ki
return “Shared key”
elseif b 6= i then
kb 6= ki
return “No shared key”
endfor
Figure 3. Pseudocode of information exchange between two parts from
(
2
1
)
- OT pro-
tocol.
Definition B.2 (Trace). Let E(Fq) be an ellipic curve, and let E(Fqk) be
its Fqk -rational extension. The trace map is the function tr : E(Fqk)→ E(Fqk)
defined by tr(P ) = (1/k)
∑k−1
i=0 Φ
i(P ) where 1/k denotes the inverse of k mod the
order of E(Fqk). In particular, k = 2 for a supersingular curve in characteristic
p > 3, and tr(P ) = (1/2)(P + Φ(P )).
Hence, the trace map is important in that its eigenspaces, if nontrivial, form
two linearly independent groups that can be used to sample points PA, QA, PB ,
QB efficiently. Moreover, the trace definition assumes that gcd(k,#E(Fqk)) = 1,
which may not be the case, especially in the important setting where `A = 2.
Thus, for this scenario we also define the quasi− trace map:
Definition B.3 (Quasi-trace). Let E(Fq) be an ellipic curve, and let E(Fqk)
be its Fqk -rational extension. The quasi-trace map is the function tr : E(Fqk)→
E(Fqk) defined by tr(P ) =
∑k−1
i=0 Φ
i(P ). In particular, k = 2 for a supersingular
curve in characteristic p > 3, and tr(P ) = P + Φ(P ).
C Protocol random
(
2
1
)
- OT
In this appendix, we see the simplified scheme of the random OT proposed in [5].
C.1 Premises
1. The scheme from [5] works in a primitive additive group (G, B,Fp,+) of
prime order p, generated by base point B;
2. The hash function H : (G × G) × G → {0, 1}s is used to generate a cryp-
tographic key ki for use in a symmetric cipher defined by the functions E
(encryption) and D (decryption);
Remark C.1.0.1. Let s be a safety parameter.
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3. Abstract view of information exchange from protocol
(
2
1
)
- OT.
Sender S Receiver
Sender R Receiver
Sender (c0, c1) Receiver
Remark C.1.0.2. Let (c0, c1) = (E(k0,M0), E(k1,M1)).
C.2 Setup: Sender and Receiver
C.2.1 Setup - Sender
1. Sender secretly chooses a value y ∈ Fp;
2. Sender computes:
S = yB (1)
T = yS; (2)
3. Sender sends S to Receiver which refuses if S /∈ G.
C.2.2 Setup - Receiver
1. Receiver secretly chooses a value x ∈ Fp;
2. Receiver computes:
R = b.S + x.B (3), where b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen by Receiver;
3. Receiver sends R to Sender which refuses if R /∈ G.
C.3 Generation of cryptographic keys kj, j ∈ {0, 1}.
1. Sender computes kj = H(S,R)(yR− jT ); (4)
2. Receiver computes kb = H(S,R)(bS + xB). (5)
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C.4 Encryption and Decryption
1. Sender encrypts and sends c = (c0, c1) to Receiver. Recalling c0 = E(k0,M0)
and c1 = E(k1,M1);
2. Receiver decrypts and gets Mb = D(kb, cj), j ∈ {0, 1}.
Remark C.4.0.1. It is verified that a key kj , j ∈ {0, 1}, is computed byH(S,R)[xyB+
(b − j)T ]. Hence, at the end of the protocol if both parts are honest then we
have that kb = kj . In other words, if j = 0 then c = c0 = 0 and k0 = kb =
H(S,R)(xyB). Otherwise, if j = 1 then c = c1 = 1 and k1 = kb = H(S,R)(xyB).
kj = yR− jT ;
= y(bS + xB)− jT ; fromequation (3)
= byS + xyB − jT ;
= bT + xyB − jT ; fromequations (1) and (2)
= xyB + (b− j)T.
Therefore, we can conclude that if the Receiver chooses b /∈ j, it will not
share the secret (cryptographic key) with the Sender.
D A possibility of symmetric pairings in the SIOT
Under certain circumstances, it is possible to define a symmetric pairing eˆ :
EB [`
eA
A ] → Fp2 . We now analyze the condition under which this can happen.
In what follows, recall that a distortion map is a linear transform that maps a
curve point to a linearly independent point.
The embedding degree for EB [`
eA
A ] is only 1, not 2 as it is for E0, because
EB is defined over Fq with q := p
2, and since p = (`eAA `
eB
B f)
2 − 1, it follows
that #EB [`
eA
A ] = (`
eA
A )
2 | q − 1. Hence a distortion map ψ must map a point
P ∈ E[`eAA ](Fq) to a point Q ∈ E[`eAA ](Fq) that is linearly independent from P ,
in which case ψ linearly maps a basis (GB , HB) to another basis (G
′
B , H
′
B). In
particular, all coefficients of ψ in basis (GB , HB) must be integers mod `
eA
A . For
such a map to be a distortion map, it must have no eigenvectors (otherwise it
would fail to map those points to linearly independent points), so we can simply
require the characteristic polynomial to have no roots mod `eAA .
In that case, the map ψ(uGB + vHB) := vGB − uHB could be a suitable
distortion map. Its characteristic polynomial is λ2 + 1 which has no roots mod
`eAA for a careful choice of `A (e.g. `A = 3). Now define the modified pairing
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eˆ(P,Q) := e(P,ψ(Q)) where e(·) is the Weil pairing. Then:
eˆ(aGB + bHB , cGB + dHB) = e(aGB + bHB , dGB − cHB)
= e(aGB ,−cHB) · e(bHB , dGB)
= e(GB , HB)
−ac−bd,
eˆ(cGB + dHB , aGB + bHB) = e(cGB + dHB , bGB − aHB)
= e(cGB ,−aHB) · e(dHB , bGB)
= e(GB , HB)
−ac−bd,
so this modified pairing is symmetric.
It remains to determine if it is isogeny-equivariant. If it is, a further constraint
exists for the coefficients of U and V , namely:
eˆ(GB + λU,HB + λV ) = eˆ(GB , HB)
(1+λα)(1+λδ)
· eˆ(HB , GB)λβλγ
= eˆ(GB , HB)
(1+λα)(1+λδ)+λ2βγ
= e(GB , HB),
so we also need (1 + λα)(1 + λδ) + λ2βγ = 1 (mod `eAA ). uunionsq
D.1 Taking symmetric pairings into account
Coupling the above constraints γ = −α2/β (mod `eAA ) and δ = −α (mod `eAA )
with the additional condition (1 + λα)(1 + λδ) + λ2βγ = 1 (mod `eAA ), we have
(1 + λα)(1 − λα) − λ2βα2/β = 1 − 2λ2α2 = 1 (mod `eAA ) for any λ, or simply
2α2 = 0 (mod `eAA ), which has the solution α = α0 · 2beA/2c for `A = 2 and any
0 6 α0 < 2deA/2e, or α = α0 · `deA/2eA for `A 6= 2 and any 0 6 α0 < `beA/2cA . uunionsq
E Validating the process of sharing points (U, V)
Now, we are going to verify the sharing of points U and V between Bob and
Alice.. This is important from the point of view of the correct functionality of
the SIOT protocol with regard to the oblivious characteristic, i.e, in practical
terms, the U and V points provide the sender to generate two secret keys. Thus,
Bob will hash a uniformly random bit string w to compute the coefficients α
and β, as suggested in Section 3.4. He defines U and V points by means of the
algebraic relation U = αGB + βHB and V = −(α/β)U . After that, he sends to
Alice one of the pairs (GB , HB) or (GB − U,HB − V ). Obviously, Alice doesn’t
distinguish24 which pair of points she received. Therefore, Alice can map the
shared w string applying the same Bob’s process. Thus, upon receipt of GˆB and
24 Recalling Subsection 3.4, Lemma 1.
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HˆB points from Bob’s public key, say pˆkB = (EB , GˆB , HˆB), and knowing the
algebraic relation above, Alice defines Uˆ = αGˆB +βHˆB , Vˆ = −(α/β)Uˆ yielding
Uˆ = U and Vˆ = V . In other words, Alice and Bob have the assurance that U
and V points are being correctly shared between the parties.
Proof.
1. In a first assumption, Alice receives GˆB = (GB − U) and HˆB = (HB − V )
points from Bob. Evidently, she has not any knowledge about GB and HB
points. Thus, she performs the algebraic development below.
Uˆ = α · GˆB + β · HˆB ;
Uˆ = α · (GB − U) + β · (HB − V );
Uˆ = α ·GB − α · U + β ·HB − β · V ;
Uˆ = α ·GB + β ·HB︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
−(α · U + β · V );
Uˆ = U − (α · U + β · V );
Uˆ = U − [α · U + β · (−α
β
· U)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
;
Uˆ = U.
If Uˆ = U and V = −(α/β)U , then Vˆ = V . uunionsq
2. In this second assumption, Alice receives GˆB = GB e HˆB = HB points from
Bob. Similarly,
Uˆ = α · GˆB + β · HˆB ;
Uˆ = α ·GB + β ·HB ;
Uˆ = α ·GB + β ·HB︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
;
Uˆ = U.
Evidently, in this case, If Uˆ = U then, Vˆ = V uunionsq
.
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